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Abstract
We examined whether language affects the strength of a visual representation in memory. Participants studied a picture,
read a story about the depicted object, and then selected out of two pictures the one whose transparency level most
resembled that of the previously presented picture. The stories contained two linguistic manipulations that have been
demonstrated to affect concept availability in memory, i.e., object presence and goal-relevance. The results show that
described absence of an object caused people to select the most transparent picture more often than described presence of
the object. This effect was not moderated by goal-relevance, suggesting that our paradigm tapped into the perceptual
quality of representations rather than, for example, their linguistic availability. We discuss the implications of these findings
within a framework of grounded cognition.
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Introduction
When we comprehend language, we create a mental represen-
tation of the situation that is described by the text [1,2,3].
Embodied theories of language propose that the information in
such situation models is not merely abstract or symbolic, but rather
is grounded in our bodily experiences [4,5,6]. This proposal
implies that the representations we create or retrieve during
language processing are similar to the representations we created
when we actually experienced the respective situation. As a result,
these conceptual representations include perceptual, lexical,
semantic, and functional features and are shaped by people’s
world knowledge and beliefs [7]. There is ample evidence that
people retrieve perceptual [8–10] and motoric [11,12] information
from memory while processing language. For example, they rep-
resent the visual features of a described object or action (such
as shape, orientation, color, size, or direction of motion) while
reading about a situation [13–21].
We ask whether language can affect the activation of a concept
to such an extent that it improves or reduces the quality of a visual
representation. Only a few studies that we know of have explored
the quality of visual mental representations by manipulating the
resolution [22], realism [23], vividness [24] or spatial frequency
[15] of visual stimuli. In the current study we refer to a rep-
resentation’s quality in terms of perceptual vividness. We isolate the
perceptual component of a representation in our definition of
vividness, however, perceptual information is not exhaustive of a
conceptual representation [10]. We make the critical assumption
that when the perceptual component of a representation is
activated to a greater extent, the availability of visual information -
such as outline or color- will increase and thereby also what we call
the vividness of a mental representation in memory. We assessed
whether (a) the general activation of a concept, or (b) merely the
activation of a concept’s visual component affects vividness of a
mental representation.
Many types of linguistic information can have an impact on
the availability of concept information in memory. For example,
objects that are present [25], visible [9], or spatially close [26] to a
protagonist in a described situation are more accessible than
objects that are absent, occluded, or farther away, respectively. For
example, in one study participants read short stories describing a
characters’ view of an object that was either blocked (e.g., by a
curtain) or not [9]. They were slower to respond to verification
questions about objects that were occluded from view than to
visible objects, suggesting that the accessibility of objects is reduced
during recall when these objects are absent from the protagonist’s
view in a described situation. Another factor that affects the
accessibility of an object is whether that object is goal-relevant.
Information that is relevant to the protagonist’s goal is retrieved
faster than irrelevant information [27–32]. Responses to probe
words are faster after reading texts in which a goal was achieved,
compared to control texts that describe a simple completed action
[27,28]. This suggests that goal category information is more
accessible than information that is irrelevant (neutral) to the goal.
To investigate whether and how concept availability affects the
perceptual vividness of the associated conceptual representation in
memory, we created short stories in which we manipulated both
object presence (versus absence) and goal-relevance (versus
irrelevance). In these described situations, object presence alters
the visual components of a conceptual representation, whereas
goal-relevance may alter the conceptual representation in a non-
perceptual way. We formulated two main hypotheses.
The first major hypothesis is that increased availability of a
concept in memory leads to increased perceptual vividness of the
accompanying representation. Thus, both object presence and
goal-relevance should exert an effect on recalled vividness
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(hypothesis 1). The most straightforward evidence would come
from a pattern in which both object presence and goal-relevance
increase perceptual vividness of the concept in memory. However,
it is also possible that object presence and goal-relevance interact
in specific ways. Out of the space of possible hypotheses in support
of a mapping between concept availability and vividness, the
following two seem particularly relevant.
Research on goal-relevance has shown a greater availability for
objects that are relevant to the protagonist’s goals rather than
irrelevant [27–32]. As a result, presence or absence of an object
may only be sufficiently salient for relevant objects. In other words,
information about an object’s presence may differentiate the
availability of relevant concepts but not of irrelevant concepts [28].
In this case, we would expect an interaction in which an increased
vividness for present compared to absent objects would only be
detected for relevant objects (hypothesis 1a).
However, there is a parallel between our manipulation of
presence and manipulations of negation in the literature. There is
evidence that negated concepts do not simply reduce accessibility
of a concept, but are even replaced by alternative opposites later in
processing [33–36]. These robust effects of negation may result in
a floor level accessibility to absent concepts, regardless of their goal
relevance. In this case, we would expect an interaction in which an
increased vividness for relevant compared to irrelevant objects
would only be detected for present objects (hypothesis 1b).
The major alternative hypothesis is that only object presence
affects perceptual vividness. Describing that an object is or is not
present involves the visual aspects of a situation, whereas
describing that an object is or is not relevant to a protagonist’s
goals does not. After all, if objects are present they are visible
regardless of whether they are relevant to a protagonist’s goals.
Thus, this hypothesis predicts a main effect of presence but no
main effect of goal relevance and no interaction (hypothesis 2).
Experiment 1
Method
Ethics Statement. All participants were recruited online and
voluntarily subscribed for participation in all of the described
experiments. Written consent was not obtained because the
experiment was noninvasive. This is in accordance with
departmental practice approved by the Ethics Committee of
Psychology (ECP) at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, the
Netherlands.
Participants. 242 participants were recruited online through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com). The sam-
ple had a mean age of 35 (SD=12) and contained 153 females
(63%). 225 participants (93%) reported being a native speaker of
English. These demographics are based on 241 participants,
because the demographic data of one participant were missing.
This participant and the 16 participants that did not report
English as their native language were not excluded from the
sample, because inclusion did not alter the result pattern. All
participants were residents of the USA and were compensated
with $1.50 for their participation, which required approximately
25 minutes.
Materials and design. Two versions of twenty critical short
stories were created (see Table S1). Each story consisted of five
sentences. The first three sentences of each story introduced an
event and included information about the characters, their actions,
and a location (see example story 1). The fourth sentence
introduced a critical object that was either absent or present in
the described situation, which was defined by placing the articles
‘‘a’’ or ‘‘no’’ before the object noun. The object was relevant to the
protagonist’s goal in one version of the story (version a) but
irrelevant to the protagonist’s goal in the other version (b). Goal-
relevance was foregrounded in the first three sentences; the fourth
sentence was similar for both versions of the stories. The fifth and
final sentence did not mention the object and was neutral with
respect to the presence or goal-relevance of the object.
1: Jennifer was on a mountain bike trip with her friends:
2a: After an hour, everyone had gotten thirsty:
2b: The terrain was hilly and the trails were difficult:
3: After an hour,ð Þ They stopped to take a break at a picnic area:
4: Jennifer saw a=no water fountain there:
5: After fifteen minutes, the group climbed back on their bikes:
ð1Þ
Each story was paired with a picture that corresponded to the
described object. Additionally, 20 filler picture-story pairs were
created in which the picture did not correspond to the described
object. The transparency level of all 40 pictures was adjusted to
three different values using AdobeH PhotoshopH software. A 50%
transparency level served as a baseline condition, whereas a 45%
transparency level reflected a slightly more transparent (less vivid)
version of the picture and a 60% transparency level was slightly
more opaque (more vivid), see Table S2. We based this asymmetry
in transparency levels (45%, 50%, 60%) on a pilot study with
identical absolute differences between pictures (40%, 50%, 60%).
In this pilot study, people showed a tendency to select more
opaque pictures over more transparent pictures when matching
them to baseline pictures. In an attempt to select more comparable
relative differences in transparency, we created a smaller absolute
difference for the more transparent pictures than for the more
opaque pictures.
This approach of mapping visual transparency levels onto
representational vividness is inspired by work in social psychology
[24]. In that study, people set the recalled transparency of
previously processed pictures of a hot desert to less transparent
(more opaque) when seated in a hot room than when seated in a
cold room. The researchers interpreted this finding as evidence for
perceptual fluency, in the sense that participants who experienced
the visceral state of warmth, constructed more vivid and fluent
mental representations of hot (versus cold) images. In the current
study, we assessed how both linguistic factors affected recall of the
transparency level of previously presented pictures.
We created two lists, one for goal-relevant and one for goal-
irrelevant stories, thereby using goal-relevance as a between-
subjects factor. In each list, half of the stories described the
presence of an object and the other half described the absence of
an object, thereby using object presence as a within-subjects factor.
The lists were counterbalanced across subjects and the picture-
story pairs were presented in randomized order within subjects.
Procedure. The experiment was programmed and presented
in the Qualtrics survey research suite (http://www.qualtrics.com).
Participants were instructed to (1) look at the presented picture, (2)
read a short story, (3) decide which of two presented pictures best
matched the picture they had seen previously, and (4) answer a
question about the story. Each trial started with the presentation
of a single picture. Critical pictures were presented at a 50%
transparency level, whereas half of the filler pictures were
presented at 45% and the other half at 60%. When participants
clicked on a button on the screen, the picture disappeared and the
story appeared. After reading the story and clicking a button, the
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45% version of the previously seen picture appeared on the left of
the screen and the 60% version appeared on the right. Participants
indicated which version best matched the picture they had seen
in the first part of the trial by checking the corresponding box.
Additionally, a comprehension question that required a yes/no
response followed one fourth of the trials to make sure that
participants read the stories properly. After participants had
answered the question, the next trial started. After completing all
40 trials, participants answered 20 questions about the absence or
presence of the critical objects by checking the ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’
response box (e.g., ‘‘In the story about the mountain bike trip, did
Jennifer see a water fountain in the picnic area?’’). Finally,
participants filled out several demographical questions.
Results
Accuracy on the comprehension questions (M=0.85;
SD=0.14) and the final questions about presence of the objects
(M=0.84; SD=0.13) was high and above chance level (t
(241) = 38.79, p,.0001 and t (241) = 39.14, p,.0001, respectively),
indicating that participants properly read the stories. We
calculated the average hit rate for both transparency levels (45%
or 60%) across items for each participant, see Figure 1. Because
the two hit rates are complementary, we only discuss the hit rates
to the most transparent picture. In the following analysis and the
analyses of Experiments 2 and 3, list was included as a between-
subjects factor. Effects for the list variable are not reported, given
the lack of theoretical relevance [37]. A 2 (presence)62 (goal-
relevance)62 (list) mixed design ANOVA revealed only a
significant main effect of presence (F (1,238) = 10.69, p= .001,
n2 = .043). Participants selected the most transparent picture more
often when reading about an absent object (in 71.7% of the trials)
than when reading about a present object (in 66.4% of the trials).
Importantly, no other effects were significant, showing that goal-
relevance did not significantly affect participants’ decisions (main
effect of goal-relevance: F (1,238) = 0.50, p= .48, n2 = .00;
interaction goal-relevance*presence: F (1,238) = 0.64, p= .43,
n2 = .00).
Experiment 2
The results from Experiment 1 showed that participants selected
the transparent picture more often when reading about an absent
object than a present object. This suggests that the recalled
vividness of the picture was reduced after reading about absence of
the referent object in the described situation (relative to the object
being present in the described situation). These findings demon-
strate that vividness (quality) indeed is an aspect of perceptual
representations, and that this aspect is affected by language.
Furthermore, goal-relevance did not significantly affect partici-
pants’ decisions. This finding supports our second main hypothesis
that a change in availability of a concept in memory does not
necessarily lead to an altered perceptual vividness of the
accompanying representation. This suggests that the current
paradigm isolates the perceptual quality of a concept rather than
the overall concept availability in a more abstract way (the way a
probe word might do). In order to (a) optimize the possibility of
detecting an effect of goal-relevance by including it as a within-
subjects factor, (b) assess whether participants were aware of the
purpose of the experiment, and (c) replicate our findings, we
performed a follow-up experiment.
Method
Participants. 229 participants were recruited online through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com). This sam-
ple had a mean age of 32 (SD=11) and contained 146 females
(64%). 220 participants (96%) reported being a native speaker of
English. The participants that did not report English as their
native language were not excluded from the sample, because
inclusion did not alter the result pattern. They were all residents of
the USA and were compensated with $1.50 for their participation,
which required approximately 25 minutes.
Materials and design. The materials and design were
identical to those of Experiment 1, except that goal-relevance
was treated as a within-subject factor. This resulted in 10 goal-
relevant and 10 goal-irrelevant stories within a list, in half of which
the object was present and half of which it was absent for each
condition (5 relevant-present, 5 relevant-absent, 5 irrelevant-
present, 5 irrelevant-absent). Four lists were created that were
counterbalanced across subjects, the picture-story pairs were
presented in randomized order within subjects.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment
1 except that participants were prompted about the purpose of the
experiment. The prompt was presented after all the picture-story-
picture trials but before the presence questions and the dem-
ographic questions. This prevented the participants from post-
rationalizing the purpose of the study after focusing on absent versus
present objects in the presence questions. They received the
following instruction: ‘‘We would like to know what you think this
survey is about. In the space below, please take your best guess at
describing the purpose of this study’’.
Results
Accuracy on the comprehension questions (M=0.85;
SD=0.15) and the final questions about presence of the objects
(M=0.83; SD=0.14) was high and above chance level (t
(225) = 36.02, p,.0001 and t (225) = 36.21, p,.0001, respectively),
indicating that participants had properly read the stories. Four
participants were excluded from the sample because, when
prompted, they associated the presence of the objects in the
stories with the selection of different transparency levels of the
pictures. We calculated the average hit rate for each of both
transparency levels across items for each participant (see Figure 2)
and will only discuss the hit rates for the most transparent picture.
Consistent with our findings from Experiment 1, a 2 (presence)62
(goal-relevance)64 (list) mixed design ANOVA revealed only a
significant main effect of presence (F (1,221) = 5.42, p= .02,
n2 = .024)3; the transparent picture was selected in 69% of the
trials with an absent object and 65.5% of the trials with a present
object. Importantly, no other effects were significant, showing that
goal-relevance did not affect participants’ decisions (main effect of
Figure 1. Proportion of hits on the most transparent picture
per category in Experiment 1. Object presence represents a within-
subjects factor and goal-relevance represents a between-subjects
factor. Error bars represent the standard errors of the means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036154.g001
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goal-relevance: F (1,221) = 1.14, p= .29, n2 = .01; interaction goal-
relevance*presence: F (1,221) = 0.22, p= .64, n2 = .00).
Experiment 3
The results of Experiment 2 demonstrate that transparency
judgments were affected by presence of the target object in the
referential situation, suggesting that object absence reduced the
recalled vividness of an associated picture. Furthermore, the results
again demonstrated that described goal-relevance did not affect
transparency judgments. If the current transparency paradigm
would provide a measure of concept availability per se, we would
have expected goal-relevance to affect the results. Therefore, these
findings suggest that our paradigm specifically taps into a
perceptual aspect of conceptual representations.
A potential criticism to this conclusion could be that our
manipulation of goal-relevance did not sufficiently distinguish
between different levels of concept availability. If, for example,
goal-relevance in our stories did not affect the availability of the
stored concept, it would also not affect the perceived vividness of
the concept. To ensure that our linguistic manipulations indeed
resulted in distinct levels of concept availability (with a higher
availability for present and relevant objects as opposed to absent
and irrelevant objects), we performed a production experiment.
Method
Participants. 64 participants were recruited online through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com). The sam-
ple had a mean age of 34 (SD=13) and contained 42 females
(66%). 60 participants (94%) reported being a native speaker of
English. All participants were residents of the USA and were
compensated with $0.60 for their participation, which required
10–13 minutes on average.
Materials and Procedure. The stories were identical to
those in Experiment 2 but the final sentence was removed. No
filler stories were included in this experiment, because the only
aspect that distinguished fillers from experimental stories in the
previous experiments was whether the presented pictures matched
the object in the story or not. Because Experiment 3 did not
include pictures, the filler stories no longer served a purpose. We
created four lists with twenty stories (5 relevant-present, 5 relevant-
absent, 5 irrelevant-present, 5 irrelevant-absent) that were
counterbalanced across subjects and randomized within subjects.
Again, the experiment was programmed and presented in the
Qualtrics survey research suite. Participants were instructed to
create the fifth missing sentence that fitted the preceding four
given sentences from the story.
We aimed to measure the participants’ accessibility to the object
at the time of sentence creation by analyzing the content of the
created sentences. The rationale behind this is that a greater
semantic relatedness between the described object and the created
sentence would demonstrate an enhanced availability of the
concept. For this purpose, we computed for each condition the
semantic overlap between the critical object (e.g., water fountain)
and the produced sentences (e.g., ‘‘She went to the fountain and
quenched her thirst.’’) by means of Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA:
http://lsa.colorado.edu/). LSA is a technique for computing the
similarity of text pairs by comparing their vector representations in a
multi-dimensional vector space, which is created from a large text
corpus. Higher similarity values for stories in which the object was
present or goal-relevant would demonstrate that present and goal-
relevant stories indeed resulted in increased concept availability as
compared to stories in the absent or irrelevant condition.
Results
The similarity values computed by LSA ranged from 20.02 to
0.61. A 2 (object presence) * 2 (goal-relevance) * 4 (list)3 mixed design
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of presence (F (1,
60) = 111.06, p,.0001, n2= .65), showing that the produced
sentences had greater semantic similarity to objects in the present
rather than the absent condition (M= .29 and M= .16, respectively).
Furthermore, a significant main effect of goal-relevance (F (1,
60) = 4.80, p,.05, n2 = .07) revealed a greater semantic overlap
between produced sentences and goal-relevant objects (M= .23) as
compared to irrelevant objects (M= .21). Finally, analyses showed a
significant two-way interaction of object presence and goal-relevance
(F (1, 60) = 4.09, p,.05, n2= .06). Post-hoc paired-samples t-test
revealed that the effect of goal-relevance only occurred for present
objects (Mdiff_present = 0.31120.267= 0.045, t (63) = 2.53, p,.05) but
not for absent objects (Mdiff_absent = 0.15320.155=20.002, t,1).
These results demonstrate that both the levels of object presence and
goal-relevance as manipulated in the current study resulted in
different degrees of concept availability.
Discussion
We examined the quality of mental representations that are
activated during language processing. Previous studies on percep-
tual representations manipulated visual object features to explicitly
match or mismatch described object features. We did not. We
manipulated the perceptual quality of the response options to the
referent object and provided no matching decision alternative (both
response options had a different transparency level than the original
picture; thus, all answers were in principle incorrect). This
manipulation revealed an implicit tendency of participants to select
a more transparent (less vivid) picture after reading about a
corresponding absent object. This implies that the entities that are
not present in a described situation have a decreased perceivability
in the referent representation. Studies that used probe words to
assess the accessibility of visually absent, occluded, or distant objects
found similar results in terms of availability of a corresponding
concept [9,25,26]. Our current results extend these findings by
specifying that a specific visual aspect of the concept representation
is altered, namely its vividness.
To our knowledge, four previous studies have assessed
perceptual quality [15,22–24], only one of which is directly
relevant to our research question [22]. Here, participants read
sentences that manipulated the perceivability of an object (e.g.,
about a skier seeing a moose through fogged versus clean goggles),
Figure 2. Proportion of hits on the most transparent picture
per category in Experiment 2. Object presence and goal-relevance
represent within-subjects factors. Error bars represent the standard
errors of the means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036154.g002
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which facilitated response times to subsequently presented pictures
of the object with a matching quality (low versus high visual
resolution). Note that our current manipulation was more subtle.
Our sentences did not mention perceived visual quality, they were
embedded in stories in a task that did not require picture-to-
sentence matching, and the pictures we presented in the ex-
perimental trials were not explicitly congruent or incongruent with
the sentence in which the object was mentioned. Therefore, these
findings are less susceptible to potential task-based strategies that
participants might adopt to successfully perform the task. Any
processing strategy in which participants did relate pictures to stories
would have only been useful to distinguish experimental from filler
stories, because this was the salient (but non-critical) manipulation.
Another difference is that we studied whether linguistic
manipulations can qualitatively alter an experiential trace that
was laid down within the experiment. All participants encoded the
same pictures with identical (50%) transparency, thereby guaran-
teeing a baseline visual representation that was identical across
conditions. Any difference in recollection of the encoded pictures
should therefore be due to a difference in activation of this baseline
trace. In other words, this paradigm taps into re-activation of a
specific perceptual trace, rather than into a perceptual trace that
might have been created ad hoc during language processing. For
example, people may not have experience with seeing a moose
through foggy goggles per se [22], but their (different) prior
experience with the meaning of the words ‘‘foggy’’ and ‘‘moose’’
can still enable them to infer the approximate meaning of the
sentence and envision a hazy moose. Therefore, it may be possible
that people created a specific instant of a moose (of high or low
visual quality), rather than recruiting a visual representation of a
hazy moose from memory. For this reason, the current approach
provides straightforward evidence that the strengthening of an
experiential trace resulted in a better quality of the representation.
Whether a described object was relevant to the protagonist’s
goal did not affect the recalled transparency of encoded pictures.
To ensure that this was not due to the stimuli we created, we
performed a control experiment (Experiment 3) that demonstrated
increased accessibility to relevant compared to irrelevant concepts,
which confirms that our stimuli differentiated goal-relevance. A
significant interaction revealed that the effect of relevance only
occurred for stories in which the object was present. We
hypothesized this pattern of concept availability based on the
negation literature (hypothesis 1b) [33–36]. Overall, this pattern
suggests that the concept availability of absent objects was reduced
to floor level, resulting in an effect of goal-relevance in the
production task only for present objects.
Even though our control experiment and previous research [27–
32] convincingly showed that goal-relevance improves the
accessibility of concept information, Experiments 1 and 2 did
not reveal any effect of goal-relevance. This suggests that the
current paradigm actually tapped into visual properties rather
than overall concept availability or mere lexical accessibility,
which supports hypothesis 2. It furthermore demonstrates that
specific linguistic descriptions affect the mental representations we
store in memory by differential reactivation of a perceptual trace.
Based on these data alone, we cannot distinguish whether reading
about absent objects did not recruit the stored perceptual
information, or whether it did but the activation of the perceptual
trace decayed more quickly. However, evidence from the negation
literature suggests that early processing of negation/absence does
not yet affect concept availability, only later processing does [33–
36]. This suggests that the experiential trace of the referent
concept might have been activated, but that it decayed (or was
suppressed) shortly after. However, further research is needed to
draw such conclusions within this framework.
People speak in terms of memories fading away, having a clear
recollection of something, erasing images from one’s mind, or
having a situation fresh in memory. Our findings suggest that there
is an actual physical component of mental representations that
underlies these metaphors. In this study, we were able to isolate a
qualitative visual component of concepts. This manifested itself in
the recalled vividness of a stored representation. Even though
objects were always explicitly mentioned in the text, the vividness
of their corresponding representation in memory differed as a
function of their described presence. These findings are in line
with a grounded perspective on language processing, because they
suggest that reading situation descriptions differentially re-activates
experiential traces that were laid down previously.
The current approach provides new possibilities for future research.
Given the wealth of demonstrations of perceptual involvement during
language processing, we argue that at this point in time it is necessary
to specify which aspects of concepts contribute to which aspects of
language comprehension. This way, we will be able to formulate the
strengths and weaknesses of the grounded (experiential) view on
language processing and take new steps in understanding how people
comprehend language and represent the external world.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Experimental stories. Object presence is indicated
by the articles ‘‘a’’ or ‘‘no’’ in sentence 4 of each story. Goal-
relevance is presented in different columns: The left column
contains stories in which the object is relevant; the right column
contains stories in which the object is irrelevant.
(DOCX)
Table S2 Experimental pictures with different trans-
parency levels. From left to right: 45%; 50%; 60%.
(DOCX)
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